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Unreasonable Discrimination Against Air Travel 
Passengers  
Leah H. Kim* 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States has implemented numerous fundamental 
changes in its policies to build greater national security in response to 
the events of September 11, 2001.1 Observing many changes and 
implementations, “no aspect has been more drastically impacted than 
air travel.”2 However, the greater change has come from individuals’ 
perceptions of outsiders and has manifested in forms such as 
xenophobia and Islamophobia.3 As a result, racial, ethnic, and 
religious discrimination complaints have increased significantly in 
 
 * Leah H. Kim, J.D., Washington University School of Law (2017). 
 1  Jason Villemez, 9/11 to Now: Ways We Have Changed, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Sep. 14, 2011, 4:55 PM), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/911-to-now-ways-we-have-
changed/. 
 2  Mark C. Fava, Post September 11 Aviation Law: A Proliferation of 
Litigation Allegations of Racial Discrimination and Prosecutions of Unruly 
Passengers, 15 S.C. LAW. 34 (2004). 
 3  See, e.g., Aliyah Frumin & Amanda Sakuma, Hope and Despair: 
Being Muslim in America After 9/11, NBC NEWS (Sep. 11, 2016, 10:03 
AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/9-11-anniversary/hope-despair-
being-muslim-america-after-9-11-n645451. Islamophobia is hatred or fear of 
Muslims or of their politics or culture. Islamophobia DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/islamophobia.  
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the air transportation setting.4 However, are these claims actionable?  
Under 49 U.S.C. § 41310 (Discriminatory Statute 41310), “an air 
carrier or foreign air carrier may not subject a person, place, port, or 
type of traffic in foreign air transportation to unreasonable 
discrimination,”5 and thereby unreasonable discrimination is 
actionable.6 Air travelers continue to file complaints with the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT) to report unreasonable 
discriminatory practices by airlines and their representatives.7 The 
Discriminatory Statute 41310, however, does not define 
“unreasonable discrimination,” leading to ambiguity of actionable 
discriminatory conducts. Courts also tend to hold various actions as 
unreasonable discrimination without any additional analysis, without 
providing an exact definition of “unreasonable discrimination.”8   
 In the summer of 2015, one air passenger’s experience led to a 
social media firestorm.9 A Muslim passenger, on a flight operated by 
 
 4  Fava, supra note 2; Fredrick Kunkle, New Data Shows Airline 
Discrimination Complaints Jumped 37 Percent, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/tripping/wp/2016/11/15/as-
discrimination-complaints-rise-transportation-department-releases-more-
data-on-airlines-treatment-of-passengers/?utm_term=.9f73cea23637.   
 5  49 U.S.C. § 41310(a) (2000). 
 6  Id.  
 7  Monthly air travel consumer report reflects high volume of 
complaints that are filed by air travellers. Air Travel Consumer Report, U.S. 
DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.transportation.gov/airconsumer/air-travel-
consumer-reports (last updated Mar. 14, 2017).  
 8  See generally Morales v. TWA, 504 U.S. 374 (1992); Nader v. 
Allegheny Airlines, 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In these cases, courts 
continue to use the language of “unreasonable discrimination” to describe 
certain conducts. However, they never seem to define the exact meaning of 
the definition.  
 9  See Ray Sanchez, United Apologizes After In-flight Discrimination, 
CNN (June 3, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/30/us/united-flight-
muslim-chaplain/. See also Medha Imam, Northwestern Chaplain Talks 
United Discrimination Incident, Islam and Sports, USA TODAY C. (Oct. 27, 
2015), http://college.usatoday.com/2015/10/27/meet-tahera-ahmad.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/23
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United Airlines, asked a flight attendant for an unopened can of soda 
for hygienic reasons during the routine beverage service.10 The flight 
attendant refused to give her one, “but then handed an unopened can 
of beer to a man seated nearby.”11 When the Muslim passenger 
questioned the flight attendant, the flight attendant responded that, 
“we are unauthorized to give unopened cans to people because they 
may use it as a weapon on the plane.”12 This Muslim passenger was 
treated differently from another passenger. And, the conduct of the 
flight attendant appears to constitute discrimination to an ordinary 
person,13 but does this incident fall into the category of unreasonable 
discrimination to be actionable under the Discriminatory Statute 
41310?  
The purpose of this Note is to propose a preliminary test that the 
DOT could utilize to determine whether an alleged discriminatory 
conduct would be deemed unreasonable discrimination under 
aviation discrimination statutes. The preliminary test will provide the 
basic mechanism to evaluate whether air transportation incidents 
similar to the United Airlines incident are actionable. This Note first 
discusses the history of the development of Discriminatory Practices 
Statute 41310, as well as past court cases and consent orders of the 
DOT, to delineate how the courts and the DOT have generally 
interpreted the language “unreasonable discrimination” over time. 
The past interpretation of the language will show whether sufficient 
notice has been provided to airlines to be in compliance with 
discriminatory statutes, and to passengers to recognize unreasonable 
 
 10  Sanchez, supra note 9. 
 11  Id.  
 12  Id. Although the flight attendant had not explicitly stated that the 
refusal of an unopened can of soda was based on her status as a Muslim, the 
flight attendant’s response certainly implied a certain degree of 
Islamophobia.  
 13  Discrimination is “the practice of unfairly treating a person or group 
of people differently from other people or groups of people.” 
Discrimination, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/discrimination (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). 
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discriminatory practices.  
The second part of this Note focuses on the general use of 
“unreasonable discrimination” language in employment settings.14 
Aviation law is an area in which case law and interpretation of 
relevant statutes are scarce because of the “relatively ‘newness’ of 
aviation law and text on the subject.”15 Therefore, this Note uses the 
method of borrowing the interpretations of analogous statutes16 to 
understand what constitutes unreasonable discriminatory practices in 
the air transportation setting.  
After a preliminary test is proposed, this Note will examine 
whether the protected classification list17 enumerated in 49 U.S.C. § 
40127 (Discriminatory Statute 40127) is exclusive. Discriminating 
 
 14  Title VII (Employment Discrimination Statute) is an employment 
discrimination statute that prohibits discrimination based on employee’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964). The U.S. Department of Transportation 
is aware of the limited case law that provides interpretation of aviation 
statutes, such as 49 U.S.C. § 41310 (2000). As a result, it is common and 
well-established practice at the DOT to base a claim on analogous statutes. 
Employment settings and public accommodation (Title II) are recognized to 
have the most similar fact patterns to those of air transportation. However, 
one must recognize that the fact patterns of employment setting and air 
transportation will never be exactly the same. See also infra note 93. 
 15  Steve V. Dedmon, Aviation Law: Cases and Materials, 16 J. 
AVIATION/AEROSPACE EDUC. & RES. 15 (2007), 
http://commons.erau.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1472&context=jaaer. 
 16  See J. Russell E. Carparelli, The Rehnquist Court’s Canons of 
Statutory Construction, NCSL, at 4 (2013), 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/lsss/2013PDS/Rehnquist_Court_Canons_cit
ations.pdf (one of the statutory constructions is the borrowed statute rule: 
“when Congress borrows a statute, it adopts by implication interpretations 
placed on the statute, absent express statement to the contrary.”), derived 
from William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as 
Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994). 
 17  “[R]ace, color, national origin, religion, sex, [and] ancestry” are 
protected groups under the statute. 49 U.S.C. § 40127 (2000).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/23
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against a person solely based on an enumerated classification 
constitutes a violation of Discriminatory Statute 40127.18 There is a 
circuit split regarding whether the statute should protect other 
classified groups19 beyond those classifications and the scope of the 
enumerated classifications.20  
Finally, this Note will propose how the DOT and courts should 
interpret “unreasonable discrimination” in the context of air 
transportation. By examining previous air transportation 
discrimination cases and incidents, the proposal will establish a 
framework to categorize and distinguish unreasonable and reasonable 
discriminatory practices of airlines. This will require engendering a 
balancing test, because the justification of discriminatory practices 
provided by airlines is not genuine and often are pretexts for 
discrimination.   
I. HISTORY 
Discrimination in transportation can be defined as the denial of 
 
 18  According to 49 U.S.C. 40127, an air carrier or foreign air carrier 
may not subject a person in air transportation to discrimination on the basis 
of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, or ancestry.  
 19  For example, there is a circuit split concerning whether 
discrimination based on sexual orientation constitutes sex discrimination. 
Title VII enumerates the same classification as in 49 U.S.C. 40127 (2000), 
but some circuits are not willing to include sexual orientation within the 
category of sex. See Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131 (10th 
Cir. 2005) (finding that discrimination based on sexual orientation does not 
constitute discrimination based on sex; therefore, the complainant’s claim 
was baseless); see also Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., No. 15-1720, 2017 
WL 1230393 (Apr. 4, 2017) (concluded that discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination). But see Smith v. City of 
Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding victims of discrimination 
based on sexual orientation may be able to assert a Title VII claim of sex 
discrimination). 
 20  Supra note 22.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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equal access, services, or treatment in modes of public 
transportation.21 Not all discriminatory practices are considered 
illegal and prohibited by federal laws; only unreasonable 
discrimination is prohibited.22 Unreasonable discrimination is unjust 
discrimination or unreasonable preference or prejudice, when used in 
transportation context.23 Yet, the Code of Federal Regulations 
(C.F.R.) definition does not indicate the types of practices by an air 
carrier or foreign air carrier that may be considered unreasonable 
discrimination in the context of air transportation.24 Unreasonable 
discrimination that is prohibited by federal law and enforced by the 
DOT is not limited to discrimination based on race.25 However, the 
history of discriminatory practices manifests that public 
transportation was and continues to be the main area in which the 
members of minority groups, especially racial minorities, experience 
 
 21  DAVID BRADLEY & SHELLEY FISHER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS IN AMERICA 850 (Armonk, N.Y. Sharpe Reference, 1998). 
Throughout American history, members of minority groups, not limited to 
African Americans, have confronted systematic discrimination and 
segregation on modes of transportation. Id.  
 22  Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937). 
“Proper and reasonable discrimination between classes to promote fair 
competitive conditions and to equalize economic advantages is therefore 
lawful.” Id. at 426. 
 23  14 C.F.R. § 399.36(a)(1) (1964). 
 24  Id. “An air carrier or foreign air carrier may not subject a person, 
place, port, or type of traffic in foreign air transportation to unreasonable 
discrimination.” 49 U.S.C. § 41310(a) (2000).   
 25  “An air carrier or foreign air carrier may not subject a person in air 
transportation to discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, 
religion, sex, or ancestry.” 49 U.S.C. § 40127(a) (2000). When an air carrier 
subjects a person to unreasonable discrimination, this leads to the violation 
of both 49 U.S.C. §§ 41310 and 40127 because the statutes protect persons 
from discriminatory practices. This is evidenced by the Consent Order 
(Docket OST-2011-0003) issued by the U.S. Department of Transportation 
against United Airlines on November 1, 2011. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
CONSENT ORDER No. 2011-11-02 (Nov. 2, 2011). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/23
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discrimination.26  
A. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 
The legislative history of the Discriminatory Statute 41310 traces 
back to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and its subsequent 
amendments, which regulated earlier modes of public transportation, 
especially railroads.27 African Americans were systematically 
discriminated against in railroad transportation.28 The prevalence and 
severity of discriminatory practices associated with transportation is 
reflected in the writings of Frederick Douglass.29 According to 
Douglass, “a most unrighteous and proscriptive rule prevailed, by 
which colored men and women were subjected to all manner of 
indignity in the use of [railroads]” in 1849.30 Although the movement 
of African Americans was extremely limited before the Emancipation 
Proclamation due to their status as slaves, 31 discriminatory practices 
based on race were prevalent in public transportation preceding the 
Civil War.32 Southern states eventually formulated the “Jim Crow” 
notion, which existed long before the Civil War, 33 into a de jure 
racial segregation scheme in the public transportation setting, 
opening the Jim Crow Era, to perpetuate segregation after the War.34 
In other words, the Civil War, the Emancipation Proclamation, and 
 
 26  Bradley, supra note 21.  
 27  Id.  
 28  Id.  
 29  Frederick Douglass, Prejudice Not Natural, 
TEACHINGAMERICANHISTORY.ORG (June 8, 1849), 
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/prejudice-not-natural/. 
 30  Id.  
 31  Bradley, supra note 21. For example, a New Orleans Railroad in the 
1830s instituted black only cars. Id. at 8.  
 32  Bradley, supra note 21, at 8. 
 33  The concept of Jim Crow was not novel. Bradley, supra note 21, at 
7. 
 34  Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the Reconstruction Amendments35 that followed did not end 
discrimination in public transportation36 because the start of the Jim 
Crow Era after the Civil War merely perpetuated discriminatory 
practices.37  
The actual racial caste system of Jim Crow segregation was 
applied to the post-Reconstruction era beginning in 1877 when 
southern states took legal action to separate the races in public 
spaces,38 including the modes of public transportation.39 In response 
to segregation that was deemed legal40 by states in the post-war era, 
Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 to combat 
deeply entrenched Jim Crow laws.41 The passage of the Act, 
 
 35  Reconstruction Amendments, PBS: SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME, 
http://www.pbs.org/tpt/slavery-by-another-name/themes/reconstruction-
amendments (last visited Apr. 13, 2017, 2:10 PM). The purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was “to secure to a race recently emancipated and 
held in slavery through many generations, all the civil rights that the 
superior race enjoy and to prohibit the implication of inferiority. Strauder v. 
W. Va., 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879).  
 36  See generally Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950); see 
also Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).  
 37   Bradley, supra note 21. Jim Crow was named after a popular 19th-
century minstrel song that stereotyped African Americans, and "Jim Crow" 
came to personify the system of government-sanctioned racial oppression 
and segregation in the United States. The Rise and Fall of Jim Crow, PBS, 
https://www.pbs.org/wnet/jimcrow (last visited Feb. 17, 2017).  
 38  David Pilgrim, Jim Crow Museum of Racist Memorabilia, FERRIS 
ST. U. (Sept. 2000), http://www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/what.htm.  
 39  See, e.g., Segregation of Railroad Cars, HISTORY ENGINE, 
https://historyengine.richmond.edu/episodes/view/3273 (last visited Mar. 23, 
2017) (Virginia’s segregated railroad law). 
 40  The notion of separate but equal had long persisted in the post-Civil 
War era to continue justifying segregation. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537, 552 (1896). 
 41  The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 was implemented to regulate 
the railroad industry, including regulating how railroad companies 
conducted their business, controlling rail rates, and preventing monopolies 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/23
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however, did not result in a dramatic change as expected because the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) subsequently acknowledged 
the notion of “separate but equal” that had been embraced by the 
federal courts.42 The ICC continued to conclude that separate and 
unequal facilities and accommodations did not violate Section 3 of 
the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.43 However, in 1941, the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that discriminatory practices in interstate travel, 
which had long been supported by the separate but equal doctrine, 
violated the Interstate Commerce Act.44  
In Mitchell v. United States, the Supreme Court used the term 
 
by the promotion of fair markets and competition. Also, the Act established 
the Interstate Commerce Commission as a regulatory agency to implement 
the law. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). The Act 
included provisions for regulating railroad travel, and Section 3 of the act 
required carriers to provide equal facilities for all passengers. Bradley, supra 
note 21, at 15.  
 42  Robert W. Steele, Constitutional Law: Interstate Commerce: 
Validity of Segregation in Interstate Railway Facilities, 54 MICH. L. REV. 
1175, 1176 (1956) (“the federal courts and the ICC have interpreted section 
3 (1) to allow carriers to segregate races so long as equal facilities were 
supplied to all passengers”). See also Mark V. Tushnet, Segregation, GALE, 
http://ic.galegroup.com/ic/uhic/ReferenceDetailsPage/ReferenceDetailsWin
dow?zid=ec317786f6e0d24f6124a3982518bc78&action=2&catId=GALE%
7C00000000MXNC&documentId=GALE%7CCX3401803794&userGroup
Name=mlin_s_ccreg&jsid=4d647bb20e73906a0a4f88072e81205b (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2017) (“Many southern states adopted laws expressly 
requiring racial segregation in transportation, schools, and elsewhere. The 
Supreme Court upheld such laws in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) . . . but no 
state took the requirement of equality seriously . . . .”). 
 43  Steele, supra note 42.  
 44  Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941). The procedural 
history of Mitchell is that the plaintiff, a black passenger who had purchased 
a first-class ticket, filed a complaint with the ICC. The plaintiff’s allegation 
was unjust (unreasonable) discrimination based on his race. The ICC 
dismissed the complaint, and when he brought the case to a federal district 
court, the court affirmed the decision of the ICC. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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“unjust discrimination,”45 which is interchangeable with unreasonable 
discrimination, and repeatedly labeled the discriminatory practice to 
be “unjust.”46 Even after Mitchell, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission ruled that segregation in the railway industry did not 
violate the Interstate Commerce Act. Therefore, African Americans 
who encountered discrimination in the railroad context could not file 
complaints to bring actionable discrimination claims.47 The Supreme 
Court once again had to reverse the ICC’s decisions.48 The Supreme 
Court upheld its interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Act from 
Mitchell, to affirm protection from unreasonable discrimination.49 
Because Section Three of the Interstate Commerce Act invalidated 
the discriminatory rules and practices,50 discrimination based solely 
on race was unreasonable.51  
B. Statutes Beyond Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 
The Interstate Commerce Act was intended primarily to regulate 
the railroad industry.52 Yet, as new alternative modes of 
transportation—such as motor vehicles and airplanes—opened up, 
the Interstate Commerce Act broadened. In 1935, Congress amended 
 
 45  Id. at 88, 92–94, 97. 
 46  “‘Unreasonable discrimination’ means unjust discrimination or 
unreasonable preference or prejudice[.]” 14 C.F.R. § 399.36(a)(1) (1980). 
 47  Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (the Interstate 
Commerce Commission found that the implemented regulation that 
segregated the dining area of the railroad car was not a violation of the 
Interstate Commerce Act). 
 48  Id.  
 49  Id. at 824. 
 50  Id. at 825. 
 51  “Where a dining car is available to passengers holding tickets 
entitling them to use it, each such passenger, regardless of race, is equally 
entitled to its facilities in accordance with reasonable regulations.” Id. at 
824. 
 52  Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/23
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the Interstate Commerce Act to grant expanded authority to the ICC 
to regulate buses and trucks.53 In addition, the basis of the Interstate 
Commerce Act as incorporated into various federal transportation 
regulations, such as Title 49 of the United States Code.54 This leads 
to a reasonable presumption that the Supreme Court’s interpretations 
of discriminatory practices in railroad transportation under the 
Interstate Commerce Act remained true to other modes of 
transportation, which are protected by Title 49.55  
Unlike the Interstate Commerce Act, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 
193856—another statute regulating air transportation—does not 
confer the power to grant monetary damages or reparations for past 
 
 53  Motor Carrier Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-255, 49 Stat. 543, ch. 
498, approved 1935-08-09. This Act was an amendment to the Interstate 
Commerce Act. Under the Motor Carrier Act, Congress recognized trucking 
and bus lines as common carriers. This reflects the continuous expansion of 
what modes of transportation qualify as common carriers. Id. Common 
carrier is a carrier offering its services at published rates to all persons for 
interstate transportation. See Common Carrier, FREE DICTIONARY, 
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Common+Carrier (last visited 
at Mar. 23, 2017). Also, a common carrier that unjustifiably refuses to carry 
a particular person or cargo may be sued for damages. Motor Carrier Act, 
Pub. L. No. 74-255, 49 Stat. 543 (1935).    
 54  Title 49 of the United States Code enumerates transportation 
regulations. These regulations do not specifically state that the regulations 
are successors of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. However, the 
“Reference in Text” and “Clarification of Congressional Intent” sections 
mention the Interstate Commerce Act and how some clauses arise under the 
provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. Title 49—Transportation, U.S. 
GOV’T PRINTING OFF., http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-
title49/html/USCODE-2011-title49.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2017); see 
also L. Revision Couns. of the H.R., United States Code 1988 Edition, U.S. 
GOV’T PRINTING OFF. (1989), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-
reg/ica.pdf.   
 55  Id.  
 56  Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (CAA), Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 
973. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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misconduct of the carrier upon an administrative agency.57 In 
addition, there is a lack of direct evidence,58 such as traceable 
legislative history, that the Civil Aeronautics Act was one of the 
successor acts of the Interstate Commerce Act.59 However, not only 
did a district court used the Interstate Commerce Act to analyze Civil 
Aeronautics Act,60 but also another district court stated that the Civil 
Aeronautics Act is one of the developments of the Interstate 
Commerce Act in legislating controls over the newer air 
transportation.61  
However, in Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., the 
plaintiff filed a claim against the Pan American air carrier for racial 
discrimination in the context of air transportation.62 The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals construed the Civil Aeronautics Act in light 
of the recent Supreme Court decision, Henderson v. United States, 
which viewed the question of railroad discrimination under the 
Interstate Commerce Act.63 In addition, the Supreme Court concluded 
in Pan Am. v. United States that the Interstate Commerce Act of 
1887’s regulatory scheme is no less pervasive than that which 
 
 57  See Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499, 502 
(2d Cir. 1956). Initially, the Court of Appeals highlights the difference 
between the Interstate Commerce Act and Civil Aeronautics Act. However, 
the court eventually states that it must apply the Supreme Court’s decision 
and interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Act even with the apparent 
differences. Id. at 501–02.  
 58  Slick Airways, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199, 212 
(D.N.J. 1951). 
 59  Records of the Civil Aeronautics Board, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/197.html (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2017). 
 60  Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 363 (S.D. 
Cal. 1961). 
 61  Slick Airways, 107 F. Supp. at 212; Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963).  
 62  Fitzgerald, 229 F.2d 499, 500–01 (2d Cir. 1956).   
 63  Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/23
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governs the airline industry.64 Hence, it is beyond the mere 
reasonable presumption that the Supreme Court’s interpretations of 
railroad discriminatory practices under the Interstate Commerce Act 
continue to apply in air transportation.65  
C. The Development of 49 U.S.C. § 41310 
Other than the Interstate Commerce Act, there is no legislative 
history of the Discriminatory Statute 41310.66 Case law interpreting 
the Discriminatory Statute 41310 is scarce, and the Supreme Court 
and federal courts have not determined the exact meaning of 
unreasonable discrimination.67 The D.C. Circuit concluded that intent 
to discriminate is not required under the Discriminatory Statute 
41310;68 disparate impact69 is sufficient.70 However, even when 
 
 64  Pan Am. World Airways, 371 U.S. at 313.  
 65  Id.  
 66  Title 49 of U.S.C. provides “Historical and Revision Notes” of 49 
U.S.C. § 41310. However, the section merely provides amendments and 
revisions to the statute. The section does not even state the Interstate 
Commerce Act. Therefore, it can only be inferred that Title 49 of U.S.C. is 
one of the successor statutes of the Interstate Commerce Act by observing 
the Title 49 of the United States Code in its entirety. Although Title 49 of 
the U.S.C. does not contain the Clarification of Congressional Intent section, 
the Interstate Commerce Act is repeatedly mentioned throughout Title 49 of 
the United States Code. 49 U.S.C. § 41310 (2000). 
 67  Only a few district courts and courts of appeals have interpreted 49 
U.S.C. § 41310, but most of the cases are not on point to provide guidance 
of how the court will distinguish certain discriminatory practices as 
unreasonable or not.  
 68  Aerolineas Argentinas S.A. v U.S. Dep’t Of Transp., 415 F.3d 1, 6–
7 (D.C. Cir. 2005); 49 U.S.C. § 41310. 
 69  In the context of employment, a facially neutral employment 
practice may be deemed to violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
without evidence of the employer’s subjective intent to discriminate that is 
required in a disparate-treatment case. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 
490 U.S. 642, 645 (1989). Borrowing the interpretation from the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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claimants can establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, they 
will not be protected under the Discriminatory Statute 41310 unless 
the discriminatory action is unreasonable.71  
The consent orders issued by the DOT manifest that the 
Department often views the discriminatory Statutes 41310 and 
4012772 in conjunction.73 The DOT states that an airline’s refusal of 
passage to an individual because of the person’s race, color, national 
origin, religion, sex, or ancestry violates the Discriminatory Statute 
40127.74 This type of discrimination also violates the Discriminatory 
Statute 41310, indicating unreasonable discrimination.75  
For example, in a consent order issued on May 2, 2012 for 
violations by Atlantic Southeast Airlines Inc., the airline denied 
boarding to two religious leaders for a secondary screening.76 The 
enforcement office of the DOT concluded that the initial decision to 
 
employment discrimination statute, it could be interpreted that airlines need 
not have subjective intent to discriminate against passengers. Hence, the 
practices may constitute unreasonable discrimination even if certain 
practices of the aircrafts seem neutral on their face. 
 70  Aerolineas Argentinas S.A., 415 F.3d at 6. 
 71  Id. at 7.  
 72  “An air carrier or foreign air carrier may not subject a person in air 
transportation to discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, 
religion, sex, or ancestry.” 49 U.S.C. § 40127(a) (2000).  
 73  U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., CONSENT ORDER No. 2012-5-2 (May 2, 
2012) [hereinafter Consent Order Against Atlantic Southeast Airlines], 
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/eo_2012-5-2.pdf; 
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., CONSENT ORDER No. 2011-02-10 (Feb. 10, 2011), 
http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/files/docs/eo_2011-02-10.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF 
TRANSP., CONSENT ORDER No. 2011-11-02 (Nov. 2, 2011), 
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/eo_2011-11-02.pdf. 
 74  U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., CONSENT ORDER No. 2012-5-2 (May 2, 
2012) [hereinafter Atlantic Southeast Airlines Consent Order], 
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/eo_2012-5-2.pdf.  
 75  49 U.S.C. § 41310 (2000).  
 76  Atlantic Southeast Airlines Consent Order, supra note 74.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/23
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remove77 those passengers was not discriminatory,78 implying it did 
not constitute unreasonable discrimination. Yet, the conduct by the 
airline failed to comply with the Discriminatory Statutes 41310 and 
40127 when the passengers were still denied boarding even after the 
security clearance.79 A consent order issued on November 1, 2011 
concerning the violations by United Airlines had similar facts.80 “Six 
member of a United Arab Emirates (UAE) armed forces delegation 
were removed from and denied re-boarding” on the flight.81 The basis 
of the removal was their perceived Arab or Middle Eastern descent.82 
The DOT, just as in the consent order for Southeast, stated that 
United Airline’s conduct constituted violation of the air 
transportation discrimination statutes.83 However, the DOT once 
again concluded that the initial decision to remove the six passengers 
for an additional screening was not discriminatory.84 
The Discriminatory Statute 41310 prohibits unreasonable 
discrimination in air transportation. 85 Nonetheless, the highest 
 
 77  Atlantic Southeast Airlines Consent Order, supra note 74. 
“Permissive Refusal—subject to regulations of the Under Secretary of 
Transportation, an air carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier may 
refuse to transport a passenger or property the carrier decides is, or might be, 
inimical to safety.” 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2001). “Highest priority in air 
commerce is assigned to safety.” 49 USCS § 40101(a)(1) (2000).  
 78  Atlantic Southeast Airlines Consent Order, supra note 74. 
 79  Id. Once an individual who has been removed from an aircraft 
because of security concerns has been found to not be a security threat, the 
carrier must allow that individual to re-board the same aircraft and take 
his/her flight so long as the aircraft has not yet departed unless a valid safety 
or security concern exists. Id.  
 80  U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., CONSENT ORDER No. 2011-11-02 (Nov. 2, 
2011). 
 81  Id. 
 82  Id. 
 83  Consent Order Against Atlantic Southeast Airlines, supra note 73.  
 84  Id. 
 85  49 U.S.C. § 41310(a) (2000). 
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priority is assigned to safety.86 Thus, airline or airport representatives 
may discriminate passengers when the safety reasons are 
predominant.87 Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 44902, air carriers are given 
authority to make the judgment of refusing to transport passengers.88 
To prevent arbitrary or capricious action, which is used 
interchangeably with “unreasonable” by courts,89 the decision is 
reviewed based on the actual knowledge of the decision makers, 
usually captains, at the time of the decision.90 “Because the decision 
must be made in an expedient manner, there is no obligation on the 
part of the captain (or other decision-maker) to make a thorough 
inquiry into the information received, the sources of that information, 
or to engage in an investigation.”91 The judgments are protected as 
long as they were made in good faith—not arbitrarily or 
capriciously.92  
A. Unreasonable Discrimination in the Context of Employment 
Because aviation law has sparse case law and legislative history, 
the DOT commonly references analogous statutes, such as Title VII 
and Title II, and case law to provide a basis for the department’s 
interpretation of aviation statutes, including the specific language of 
the statutes.93 Therefore, observing the history of how courts have 
 
 86  49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(1) (2000).  
 87  49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(1) (2000).  
 88  49 U.S.C. §44902(b) (2011).  49 U.S.C. §44902, just as 49 U.S.C. 
§§ 41310 and 40101, is under Title 49 of the U.S. Code to regulate 
transportation.  
 89  See generally Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 52 Cal. 3d 
1142 (Cal. 1991). 
 90  Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 520 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 91  Id. at 15. The captain is “entitled to accept at face value the 
representations made to him by other air carrier employees” and his decision 
should not be based on what he should have known at the time of the 
decision-making. Id.    
 92  Id. 
 93   From my summer employment with DOT, I observed that it was a 
well-established practice for the attorneys to refer to case law from different 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/23
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interpreted unreasonable discrimination in the employment setting 
will provide a general understanding of how courts tend to 
distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable discrimination.  
Although comparing courts’ statutory interpretation is useful, 
there is a crucial point to keep in mind while conducting the statutory 
interpretation comparing analysis:94 Interpretation of employment 
discrimination statutes cannot always be applied to aviation 
discrimination statutes.95 “When conducting statutory interpretation, 
[it is important to] be careful not to apply rules applicable under one 
statute to a different statute without careful and critical 
examination.”96  
Just as Discriminatory Statutes 41310 and 40127, employment 
discrimination statutes prohibit “unreasonable discrimination.” The 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 2003 is an employment 
discrimination statute that prohibits discrimination based on 
disabilities.97 And, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
 
areas other than aviation law, such as Brown v. Board of Education, 345 
U.S. 972 (1953), when considering the issues of discrimination. 
 94  Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., U.S. 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). 
 95   Just because employment discrimination statutes use the 
“unreasonable discrimination” language, statutory interpretation of 
employment statutes do not necessarily apply to other discrimination 
statutes. Although Title VII and the ADEA share the same “because of” 
language, the Supreme Court gave different meaning in each context. Thus, 
“the Court’s interpretation of the ADEA is not governed by Title VII 
decision.” Id.  
 96  Id. 
 97  Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 
12101–12213 (2013). It is important to look at the ADA, for 49 U.S.C. § 
41310 prohibits unreasonable discrimination in general without enumerating 
the basis. Under Title 49, § 40127 prohibits discrimination based on race, 
color, national origin, religion, sex, or ancestry and § 41705 prevents 
discrimination based on disability. Therefore, the interpretation of 
“unreasonable discrimination” in the air transportation setting in regards to 
disability should be analyzed by observing the ADA.  
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(Employment Discrimination Statute) also prohibits employment 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and national 
origin.98 Within these statutes, there is no such usage of 
“unreasonable discrimination” language. Yet, in many Title VII claim 
cases, courts continue to implement the language of unreasonable 
discrimination to describe prohibited conduct by employers.99 The 
interpretation of “unreasonable discrimination” in the employment 
discrimination cases could, therefore, be analyzed to understand the 
use of the same language in the Discriminatory Statute 41310.  
The DOT consent order states that removal of a passenger based 
on reasonable suspicion is not a discriminatory practice.100 The 
removed passenger may argue that the removal caused humiliation 
and intangible harms.101 Nevertheless, not all intangible harms are 
 
 98  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.  
 99  See Miller v. Indus. Comm’n, 480 P.2d 565, 568 (Colo. 1971) 
(upholding the denial of unemployment benefits to a female employee 
separated from her job because pregnancy does not constitute unreasonable 
discrimination against female employees); McCarthy v. Burkholder, No. 75-
136-C6, 1977 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16299, at *5 (D.C. Kans.1977) (“the mere 
fact leave with pay is denied those taking leave due to pregnancy, while pay 
is allowed those taking sick leave generally, does not constitute an invidious 
or unreasonable discrimination”).  
 100  U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., CONSENT ORDER No. 2012-5-2 (May 2, 2012), 
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/eo_2012-5-2.pdf (the 
Enforcement Office found that the initial decision to remove the passengers 
from the aircraft “to conduct secondary screening was not discriminatory”). 
101 See generally Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see 
also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Nick Visser, Muslim 
Woman Says Plane Crew Denied Her Unopened Soda Can Because It Could 
Be Used ‘As A Weapon,’ HUFFINGTON POST (May 31, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/31/tahera-ahmad-soda-
united_n_7479464.html; Associated Press, Iraqis men sues American Air for 
Discrimination, NBC NEWS (Nov. 11, 20017), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/21587579/ns/travel-news/t/iraqis-men-sue-
american-air-discrimination/#.WPDsOneZPdQ. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/23
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actionable in the employment context.102 Because the case law in 
aviation law is scares, this Note analogizes aviation discrimination 
statutes to Title VII to observe how the courts have intangible harms 
in an employment setting.103  
Title VII prohibits covered employers from discriminating against 
employees based on protected classifications. It acknowledges that 
intangible harms that result from unreasonable discrimination are 
actionable.104 The Supreme Court, however, imposed limits on 
actionable intangible harms, such as a hostile work environment 
leading to emotional distress.105 In order for a discriminatory practice 
to rise to the level of Title VII discrimination, the practice must be 
“sufficiently severe or pervasive to [have] altered the conditions of 
victim’s employment and create an abusive work environment.”106 
This approach to intangible harm could probably be applied in the 
aviation sector, for it is a well-established practice for the DOT to 
view analogous statutes to support its legal stances.107 Nevertheless, 
the patterns of the consent orders and practices of the DOT seem to 
 
 102  Vinson, 477 U.S. 57; see also Harris, 510 U.S. 17; Visser, supra 
note 101. 
 103  Supra note 93. 
 104  See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 57; see also Harris, 510 U.S. at 17. 
 105  Supra note 104. See also Enforcement Guidance, U.S. EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (last visited Apr. 14, 2017, 5:32 PM), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/damages.html (damages are available for 
the intangible injuries of emotional harm such as emotional pain, suffering, 
inconvenience, mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life). See generally 
Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  
 106  Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22. Alleged discriminatory practice by an 
employer must be more than mere annoyance to constitute a Title VII 
violation. The conduct or practice must be severe or pervasive enough to 
have created an objectively, according to a reasonable person, hostile or 
abusive work environment. Also, the conduct reaches a level that the 
employee, who is the victim of the discrimination, must subjectively 
perceive the workplace environment to be hostile or abusive. Id.  
 107  See Supra note 93.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
Document7  12/17/17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
294 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 54:275 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reflect the department’s hesitance to recognize intangible harms as an 
actionable claim in air transportation setting.108 Unlike Title VII 
intangible discriminatory claims, interactions between passengers and 
airline representatives are very limited in that there lacks a 
continuous relationship like the one between employers and 
employees.109  
II. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 
The gradual development of Discriminatory Statutes 41310 and 
41217 from the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act manifests 
a legislative effort to ban discrimination in the transportation 
realm.110 Even with the legislative effort, the ambiguity of 
“unreasonable discrimination” continues to prevail. When 
interpreting the Discriminatory Statute 41310 to determine whether 
an airline has engaged in unreasonable discrimination, the DOT 
usually studies each topic111 mentioned in the History section to 
identify the legislative intent of the statutes.112 This method of 
 
 108  See supra note 73. Over the course of my summer employment at 
the DOT, intangible harms were not treated as actionable claims if certain 
thresholds were satisfied.  
 109  In general, isolated incidents do not rise to the level of actionable 
discrimination in an employment setting unless the complainant can 
establish that the conduct by the employer was extremely serious. 
Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2017, 5:50 PM), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/harassment.cfm. Usually, the interactions 
between airline representative and passengers usually do not continue long 
term. The duration of interactions ranges between several minutes to a 
couple of hours.  
 110  Supra note 54; see also supra note 66. 
 111  Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887); Civil Rights 
Acts of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.  
 112  Over the course of my summer employment at the DOT, different 
statutes, unrelated to aviation law, were researched and studied to interpret 
aviation statutes.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/23
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statutory interpretation is inefficient and unproductive. Although the 
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 is, without a doubt, the 
fundamental basis of the Discriminatory Statute 41310, the 
applications have been mostly limited to railroad and patent racial 
discrimination circumstances, such as segregated facilities.113 Air 
transportation discrimination often involves latent discrimination— 
meaning airlines do not outright discriminate against passengers by 
creating segregated facilities—and many passengers encounter 
discrimination based on classification other than race.114 Thus, 
comparing the Interstate Commerce Act and the Discriminatory 
Statute 41310 to discern a universal meaning for unreasonable 
discrimination seems infeasible.  
In addition to the Interstate Commerce Act, Title VII 
(Employment Discrimination Statute) and relevant case law are used 
by the DOT to interpret the Discriminatory Statutes 41310 and 
41270, because both employment and air transportation statutes cover 
the same protected groups.115 Nevertheless, the standards of the 
Employment Discrimination Statute116 to distinguish unreasonable 
discrimination from lawful discrimination seem to harbor too high of 
burden for them to be implemented in air transportation context.117 
One of the well-known standards in employment setting is that 
employers may not commit “intangible” discrimination that is 
“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s 
 
 113   Supra notes 42, 66 and accompanying text. 
 114  Fredrick Kunkle, New Data Shows Airline Discrimination 
Complaints Jumped 37 Percent, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/tripping/wp/2016/11/15/as-
discrimination-complaints-rise-transportation-department-releases-more-
data-on-airlines-treatment-of-passengers/?utm_term=.c2a86f8cc660. 
 115  Both Title VII and Discriminatory Statutes 40127 enumerate the 
following as protected classes: “race, color, religion, sex, [and] national 
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); 49 U.S.C. § 40127. 
 116  Severity or pervasiveness standard. Infra note 118. 
 117  Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), with Interstate Commerce Act 
of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, and 49 U.S.C. § 40127. 
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employment and create an abusive working environment.”118 In air 
transportation setting, however, airline representatives, who may 
engage in discriminatory conduct, and passengers are limited to one 
or two interactions, whereas continuing interactions are formed 
between employers and employees. The difference in the degree of 
interaction causes different forms and extent of discrimination. 
Hence, the DOT should not rely solely on the Employment 
Discrimination Statute and its relevant common law standards to 
determine when certain conducts constitute unreasonable 
discrimination. Trying to enforce the Discriminatory Statutes without 
complete understanding of meaning of “unreasonable discrimination” 
that is tailored to the air transportation context is problematic.  
The myriad of discrimination complaints filed by passengers119 
each year is unlikely to decrease because passengers lack knowledge 
of what constitutes actionable discrimination. Airlines may also take 
an economic approach to argue that violating the Discriminatory 
Statutes will cost less than trying to prevent or alter every conduct, 
service, and policy that may constitute unreasonable discrimination 
because of lack of definite standards.   
As it appears, courts repeatedly utilized the language of 
unreasonable or unjust discrimination without further analysis to 
determine whether the airlines were in violation of discriminatory 
statutes.120 Conversely, the courts have yet to provide guidance or 
certain standards of what types of discriminatory practices are 
considered reasonable or unreasonable.121 The lack of guidance is 
problematic because when complainants either file complaints with 
 
 118  Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.  
 119  See, e.g., AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT, supra note 7. 
 120  See generally Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 520 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2008). But see Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 363–
64 (S.D. Cal. 1961) (analogizing the Interstate Commerce Act’s 
interpretation of “unjust discrimination” to analyze the meaning of “unjust 
discrimination” under the Civil Aeronautics Act).  
 121  Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/23
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the DOT or file a lawsuit against an airline in court, both parties 
cannot make general prediction of the outcomes.  
The lack of predictability leads to two extreme positions. First, 
baseless complaints could continuously be filed with the DOT.122 The 
language of unreasonable discrimination is very ambiguous, 
subjective, and without any guidance or standard.123 Therefore, a 
complainant may have a meritless and non-actionable claim, but may 
still be filed with the DOT via email, phone call, or agency’s 
website.124 Obviously, the human and financial resources of the DOT 
are limited, and the inundation of meritless complaints will likely to 
avert the necessary resources to the complaints with merit.  
Second, the lack of predictability may lead parties to avoid the 
formal justice system to resolve violations of fundamental rights. 
Complainants and respondents (airlines) may decide to agree on 
settlements via different means of alternative dispute resolution 
instead of actual adjudication. This may seem to bring positive 
outcomes by lightening caseloads and conserving the litigation costs 
of both parties. However, circumventing the courts means that the 
judicial system may be deprived of chances to develop important case 
law in these areas since settlement agreements are almost always kept 
private.125 There may be incidents, such as Brown v. Board of 
 
 122  Not every complaint alleging discrimination by airlines will lead to 
enforcement actions. Processing of Complaints Alleging Discrimination by 
Airlines Based on Race, Color, National Origin, Sex, Religion or Ancestry, 
U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. (last updated Jan. 15, 2015), 
https://www.transportation.gov/airconsumer/processing-complaints-
alleging-discrimination-airlines-based-race-color.  
 123  Supra note 67.  
 124  Id.; File a Consumer Complaint, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. (last updated 
Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.transportation.gov/airconsumer/file-consumer-
complaint.  
 125  “The voluntary nature of mediation and confidentiality obligations 
means that companies can remove themselves at will and their information 
will be kept private.” Aaron Murphy, Alternative Dispute Resolution for 
Startups: Mediation and Arbitration, SPZ (July 21, 2015), 
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Education,126 when working within the judicial system is necessary in 
order to bring necessary societal changes and reforms.127 In addition, 
there is a power imbalance between the complainant and the airlines. 
Because complainants will not have the concrete idea of what 
constitutes unreasonable discrimination, the airlines may try to 
persuade the complaints to believe that its discriminatory practice 
was not severe or outrageous and have the complaint agree to lesser 
remedies. If there is a guidance that provides the concrete 
understanding of unreasonable discrimination, both parties will likely 
to have an equal footing during the negotiation and settlement even 
when they resort to keep the matter in private. To prevent these two 
extreme results from occurring, some guidance or standard of 
unreasonable discrimination in the aviation setting should be 
established by the DOT.  
There may be certain advantages for the Supreme Court to 
provide a clear definition of unreasonable discrimination. Yet, 
benefits of permitting the DOT to establish guidance, which specifies 
which set of conducts constitutes unreasonable discrimination in air 
transportation setting, appear to outweigh those of case law guidance. 
The DOT employs many subject matter experts, and these specialized 
employees can better tailor the meaning of unreasonable 
 
http://www.spzlegal.com/social-enterprise/arbitration-mediation/.  
 126  345 U.S. 972 (1953). This case “declared a great principle—non-
discrimination and racial equality—but the principle did little to change the 
day-to-day lives of most African Americans in the 1950s.” WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASE AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND 
REGULATION 2 (5th ed. 2007). The application of the case was limited to 
public institutions. Id. However, the impact of the case extended beyond the 
public institution setting. Id. Brown acted as the fundamental platform to 
bring other major social changes by the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. Id.   
 127   See J. Thelton Henderson, Symposium, Social Change, Judicial 
Activism, and the Public Interest Lawyer, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 33, 42 
(2003). Social change through judicial activism is not always effective and 
efficient. The ability of courts alone to achieve social change is limited. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/23
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discrimination within the air transportation setting. Also, the DOT 
could use the guidance to channel airlines to practice certain practical 
safety and accommodation standards that the DOT wishes to 
promote.  
The agency, of course, cannot abuse its authority to prescribe a 
meaning that is beyond the legislation’s purpose.128 The agency has 
authority to create new rules and guidance based on future 
development rather than to have Congress write general guidance, 
regulations, or standards to further the DOT’s agenda.129 There will 
always be an embedded scope of uncertainty within the enabling 
legislations.130 Nevertheless, guidance set forth by the DOT can spell 
out and enumerate specific standards and requirements that 
distinguish unreasonable and reasonable discrimination. This will 
allow the general public, especially passengers and airlines, to know 
where they stand with some degree of certainty. Also, if the guidance 
is not followed, the agency may implement simpler processes to 
sanction the airlines.   
In addition, the Administrative Procedure Acts (APAs) “require 
agencies to give public notice of proposed rules, invite public 
comment, and to consider and respond to the public’s input,” and the 
DOT “must publish the rules after they are adopted.”131 This will 
facilitate transparency that may eventually lead to legitimization of 
 
 128  “[T]he validity of a regulation promulgated thereunder will be 
sustained so long as it is ‘reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling 
legislation.’” Mourning v. Family Pubs. Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 
(1973).  
 129  MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 230–31 (4th ed. 2014). 
 130  Congress drafts vague statutory language to authorize (explicitly or 
implicitly) government agencies to fill statutory gaps. Mathew C. 
Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, HARVARD LAW, 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/mstephenson/2011PDFs/Statutory%20I
nterpreation%20by%20agencies.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2017, 5:07 PM); 
see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).  
 131 Id. at 6.  
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the guidance and acceptance by the general population. 
Although the DOT has rulemaking power, there are constraints 
that prevent the abuse of power by the department.132 One important 
constraint is that if complainants or respondents do not fit within the 
guideline established by the DOT or deem they should be exempted, 
they could always file a lawsuit in the court as a potential 
protection.133 Even when the DOT does not exceed the granted 
rulemaking power, the legislative and judicial branches have various 
methods to alter the guideline if they do not agree with the DOT’s 
interpretation of unreasonable discrimination.134 The legislative 
branch could make an amendment to the statutes to clarify the 
meaning of unreasonable discrimination.135 When the courts 
encounter the issue, they could establish common law that may 
contrast the guidance.136 Thus, it seems most ideal for the DOT to 
establish a guideline rather than waiting for an unreasonable 
discrimination in aviation issue to eventually reach the Supreme 
Court.   
As a result of tragic terrorist attacks that occurred in 2001, air 
transportation security intensified.137 From various consent orders 
 
 132  See generally Neil Eisner, Rulemaking Requirements, U.S. DEP’T 
TRANSP. (Mar. 2012), 
https://www.transportation.gov/regulations/rulemaking-requirements-2012. 
This document enumerates various constraints and requirements that the 
DOT must satisfy in its rulemaking process.  
 133  Id. at 8. If challenged in court under the APA, an agency rulemaking 
action is subject to standards whereby it can be held unlawful and set aside 
if it is found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law;” unconstitutional; or in violation of statute or a 
procedural law. The court can also “compel agency action unlawfully 
withheld or unreasonably delayed.” Id.  
 134  Id. See also 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (1996).  
 135   5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808. 
 136  Supra note 133. See also Mourning, 411 U.S. at 369. 
 137  Jason Villemez, 9/11 to Now: Ways We Have Changed, PBS NEWS 
(Sept. 14, 2011, 4:55 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/911-to-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/23
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published by the DOT, the initial removal of a person from an aircraft 
or initial denial of service because of security concerns seems to be 
acceptable even when the decision was based on race, national origin, 
or religion. 138 These current practices by airport enforcement officers 
seem to abrogate the right to be free from discrimination in the air 
transportation setting based on the protected group that is enumerated 
in the Discriminatory Statute 41310. When airline representatives 
become suspicious merely based on a passenger’s protected 
classification, the DOT appears to deem this as unreasonable 
discrimination.139 Airline representatives could make the initial 
decision to single out that passenger based on the protected 
classifications, such as race and sex, of the passenger. This may cause 
inconvenience and even humiliation for the singled out passenger.140  
In the current climate of the fear of terrorists’ threats and threat to 
security,141 this initial singling out of individuals for a second 
screening could be seen as acceptable and not discriminatory.142 
However, this does not mean that singling out a passenger is 
permitted at any time.143 The flight attendants or airline 
representatives must have reasonable suspicion of believing a 
 
now-ways-we-have-changed/.  
 138  See supra note 73 and accompanying text. “Highest priority in air 
commerce is assigned to safety.” 49 USCS § 40101(a)(1) (2000). 
 139  In consent order against Atlantic Southeast Airlines, two passengers 
were removed from the aircraft based on their religion. Atlantic Southeast 
Airlines Consent Order, supra note 74.   
 140  See Ray Sanchez, United Apologizes After In-flight Discrimination 
Claim, CNN (June 3, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/30/us/united-
flight-muslim-chaplain/ (“I am sitting on a United airlines flight in the air 
30,000ft above and I am in tears of humiliation from discrimination”).  
141 See Erroll Southers, Why Planes Remain a Terrorist Target, CNN (Nov. 
20, 2015, 8:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/20/opinions/southers-isis-
bomb-claim/. 
 142  See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 143  Supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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passenger may pose a threat.144 The standard of reasonable suspicion 
should not mean an ordinary145 and personal fear. The suspicion 
should be justified only if the suspicion is objectively reasonable. In 
other words, another reasonably prudent person would have 
perceived a similar threat.146 
Once a passenger is removed from the airline based on a 
reasonably objective suspicion, a second screening should be done to 
confirm whether the suspicion translates to actual security concerns. 
If the law enforcement officials lack sufficient evidence of a threat to 
security and clear the passenger for travel, “the carrier must allow 
that [passenger] to re-board the same aircraft and take his/her flight 
so long as the aircraft has not yet departed.”147 The passenger still has 
an actionable discrimination claims under the Discriminatory Statutes 
41310 and 41270 against the airline if the passenger was denied 
boarding back on his original aircraft after the additional security 
clearance.148  
In order to avoid arbitrariness and unreasonableness of the initial 
decision by airline representatives and enforcement officials, the 
DOT should provide more concrete standards and procedures for the 
airlines to follow. However, the establishment of a concrete 
procedure appears to be impractical because the interaction between 
 
 144  Supra notes 73, 100 and accompanying text. 
 145  Ordinary fear is often described to be subjective fear or nebulous 
fear. Reed v. MNA Mktng. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2003). Matvia v. 
Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2001). 
146 This will prevent incidents certain prevents incidents in which a flight 
attendant refusing to serve a Muslim passenger a can of soda in fear of the 
passenger to use the can as a weapon. See Imam, supra note 8.   
 147  Consent Order Against Atlantic Southeast Airlines, supra note 73. 
 148  Consent Order Against Atlantic Southeast Airlines, supra note 73. 
The U.S. Department of Transportation, however, has not explicitly stated in 
the Consent Order that this is the basic guideline to distinguish when 
unreasonable discriminatory act has occurred in the air transportation 
setting. It may be inferred from the published consent orders that this is the 
general custom and practice followed by the agency. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/23
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the airline representatives and passengers are limited to one or two 
encounters during the flight.149 Thus, possessing actual knowledge of 
how a passenger may impose a threat is almost impossible.  
Proponents of a strict interpretation of the Discriminatory Statute 
40127 may argue that any discrimination or even singling out 
passengers based on protected characteristics is actionable.150 These 
supporters will probably argue that the initial decision to remove 
passengers should be considered discriminatory even when the 
passengers are allowed to re-board the aircraft because the practice 
has led to humiliation and stigma.151 Nevertheless, air transportation 
is a sensitive issue. Second screenings for the purpose of security do 
not seem much different from extra security procedures, such as pat-
downs by TSA officers after going through a metal detector.  
The advancement of technology, especially with new modes of 
transportation and the age of globalization, has led to the frequent use 
of air transportation.152 Consequently, the increase in passengers and 
airline business has led to various issues and incidents related with 
transportation.153 However, even with the significant increase in the 
number of reported discrimination incidents, scarcity of case law and 
legislative guidance in air transportation continues.154 To clarify the 
 
 149  Supra note 109. 
 150  In the consent orders, complainants argued that they experienced 
unlawful discrimination by being singled out based on the protected classes 
regardless of the safety issues that were alleged by the airline 
representatives. Supra note 73. 
 151   Supra note 73. 
 152   See Dan-Cristian Ion, Impact of Globalization on Airport Industry, 
INT’L CONF. SCI. PAPER, at 67 (May 2011), 
http://www.afahc.ro/ro/afases/2011/manag/Ion.pdf (figure 1. delineates 
increase in both passenger and cargo traffics).  
 153  For a current list of complaints, see Aviation Enforcement Orders, 
U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., 
https://www.transportation.gov/airconsumer/enforcement-orders (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2017).  
 154  Dedmon, supra note 15.  
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meaning of unreasonable discrimination and the application of 49 
U.S.C. § 41310, additional guidance ought to be provided. 155 The 
issuance of guidance and clarification would help potential 
complainants determine whether their alleged discrimination claims 
are actionable. Eventually, this should reduce the number of 
complaints filed with the Department of Transportation.  
Just as the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has 
provided a guideline about the Americans with Disabilities Act,156 the 
DOT should draft enforcement guidance on what constitutes 
unreasonable discrimination in the context of air transportation under 
the Discriminatory Statute 41310. Issuing guidance on aviation rules 
and statutes is not novel.157 New guidance, interpreting the 
Discriminatory Statute 41310 will aid potential complainants in 
determining the viability of their claims. Then, they can determine 
whether to file the complaint with the agency or attempts to bring a 
claim of action in court for violation of federal law. In addition, such 
guidance will provide claimants with general predictability of their 
 
 155  49 U.S.C. § 41310 (2000) does not have a congressional finding. 
This will lead to a very broad interpretation of the application of the statute 
regardless of what the congressional intent might have been. For example, 
even with some concrete guidance of the congressional finding, courts 
interpreted the congressional intent of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990 with discretion. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 
(1999). Therefore, Congress enacted the ADA Amendment Act of 20008 
(Public Law 100-325) in response to Sutton to reject the Court’s 
interpretation. This manifests that without sufficient guidance, courts and the 
DOT may interpret unreasonable discrimination with a wide range of 
discretion. 
 156  See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE 
HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (2002), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html.  
 157  Guidance on Aviation Rules and Statutes, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
https://www.transportation.gov/airconsumer/guidance-aviation-rules-and-
statutes (last visited Mar. 24, 2017). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/23
Document7  12/22/2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] Unreasonable Discrimination Against Air Travel Passengers305 
 
 
 
 
 
 
unreasonable discrimination claims. Of course, the agency or court 
should still determine whether a discrimination claim is actionable on 
an individual basis. Without individual inquiry, the agency and courts 
will be making a “determination based on general information.”158 
Even if the DOT publishes guidance document, they will not be a 
binding source just as the guidance document of other agencies is not 
binding.159 The guidance document will merely represent the DOT’s 
current thinking.160 If the unreasonable discriminatory practice falls 
under 49 U.S.C. § 41310 (c), the practice will become actionable 
even when the practice is of first impression and has not been 
specified by the guidance.161 If courts do not agree that the 
interpretation reflects the true congressional intent of the 
Discriminatory Statute 41310, the courts can take a different stance in 
interpreting the meaning of unreasonable discrimination.162 If 
Congress determines that the courts are implementing either too 
narrow or broad an interpretation of the meaning of unreasonable 
discrimination, Congress should enact an amendment to the 
 
 158   See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483. The logic comes from Sutton when the 
Supreme Court was interpreting the meaning of disability under the ADA. 
According to the Supreme Court, the lack of individualized inquiry will 
“often require courts and employers to speculate about a person’s condition 
and would, in many cases, force them to make a disability determination 
based on general information” Id.  
 159  See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (d)(3) (2000) (Food and Drug 
Administration good guidance practices). 
 160  See, e.g., id. 
 161   49. U.S.C. § 41301(c) (2000). When an unreasonable 
discriminatory practice is a question of public interest, the DOT’s answer in 
the public interest is subjected merely to the limited view by the President 
and to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. Aerolineas 
Argentinas S.A. v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 415 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2005).   
 162  In Sutton, the Supreme Court decided the EEOC guidance on the 
ADA was contrary to the congressional intent for enacting the ADA and 
abandoned the guidance. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 471.  
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Discriminatory Statute 41301 for clarification.163 
CONCLUSION 
 The demand for air transportation will continue to increase 
over time.164 This will lead to more incidents of discriminatory 
practices. “Unreasonable discrimination,” as stated in the 
Discriminatory Statute 41310, prohibits discrimination in the air 
transportation context, but it remains ambiguous to pinpoint which 
discriminatory practices qualify as unreasonable discrimination. By 
establishing a basic guideline for determining unreasonable 
discrimination by the DOT, meritless claims would likely decrease, 
for the potential complainants may identify actionable discriminatory 
claims by referring to the guidance. In addition, the airline industry 
and airport enforcement officials will have preliminary but concrete 
instruction to guide their practices and prevent unreasonable 
discriminatory conduct.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 163   This is not an abnormal act of Congress. In 2008, Congress passed 
the ADA Amendment Act of 2008 (ADAAA) to broaden the coverage of the 
ADA after the series of the Supreme Court decisions that narrowly 
interpreted the meaning of disability under the ADA. ADA Amendment Act 
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3554 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 12101 
et seq. (2009)). 
 164  See Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., Airline Passenger Travel 
to Nearly Double in Two Decades (Mar. 8, 2012), 
https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=13394 
(“The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) released its annual forecast 
today projecting airline passenger travel will nearly double in the next 20 
years.”). 
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